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The political and theoretical views developed by the radical group Socialisme 
ou Barbarie from 1949 onward, have only recently received some attention 
outside the French speaking world.2 For a long period things were little different 
in France where the group and its similarly named periodical also received scant 
attention. This only changed after the students' and workers' rebellion in May- 
June 1968. The remnants of the journal, which had been unsaleable up to then - 
it had stopped appearing three years earlier - suddenly became a hot-selling 
item. Many of the 'heretical' ideas published in it seemed to be confirmed by the 
unexpected revolt. In 1977 the daily Le Monde wrote on the intellectual efforts 
of Socialisme ou Barbarie: "This work - aIthough unknown to the public at 
large -has nevertheless had a powerful influence on those who played a role in 
May 1968." In the writings of the group one finds "most of the ideas which are 
being debated nowadays (from workers' control through to the critique of 
modern technology, of Bolshevism or of  mar^)."^ 
In Socialisme ou Barbarie an attempt was made to consider the bureaucra- 
tization of social movements. The central questions were: is it an iron law that 
movements opposing the existing order either fall apart or change into rigid 
hierarchies? How can militants organize themselves without being absorbed or 
rigidified into a bureaucratic apparatus? Socialisme ou Barbarie first posed 
these questions because the group asked itself why things had gone wrong in the 
traditional labour movement. After all, in the course of the twentieth century this 
movement had increasingly alienated itself from its grass roots and taken on the 
shape of turgid labour and trade union bureaucracies. 
In reaction to this development Socialisme ou Barbarie tried to stimulate 
new types of opposition. The approach used was that of direct democracy. The 
history of the group was essentially a lengthy search for a new relationship 
between spontaneity and organization, between practice and theory. The debates 
which took place during this search often had a freshness which is still relevant 
today. 
Socialisme ou Barbarie's most prominent intellectuals were Castoriadis and 
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Lefort. Cornelius Castoriadis was born in 1922 and studied law, economics and 
philosophy at the University of Athens. Before the Second World War, during 
the dictatorship of Metaxas, he had joined the Greek Communist youth organi- 
zation. However, when the Germans occupied the country and the Communist 
Party wanted to ally itself with the bourgeois resistance, Castoriadis rejected the 
decision. After a short period of political wanderings, he ended up with a small 
Trotskyist group led by Spiros Stinas. This was a risky choice, because 
Trotskyists were threatened from two sides in Greece. The occupying power 
persecuted them whenever possible and in 1943 executed the most important 
leaders, among them Pantelis Pouliopoulis and Yannis Xypol i to~ .~  When the 
country was 'liberated' in 1944, it was the Communists' turn. During massive 
'mopping-up operations' they murdered at least 600 of Trotsky's followers, 
often after having tortured them.5 This traumatic experience was a determining 
factor in Castoriadis' further development. The Trotskyist view on Stalinism, 
which he had supported only a short time before, seemed less and less correct. 
The Stalinists were not a part of the labour movement which had been absorbed 
by capitalism, as Trotsky had claimed, but bureaucrats, who opposed the work- 
ers as well as capitalism! When Castoriadis settled in France at the end of 1945 
he joined the Parti Comnzuniste Internationale (PCI), the French section of the 
Fourth International, which had a few hundred members. He immediately 
started propagating his new position. 
Claude Lefort was Castoriadis' most important partner in the building of the 
dissident current in the PCI. Born in 1924, Lefort was still a philosophy student 
when he met Castoriadis for the first time. As early as 1943 he had formed an 
underground group at the LycCe Henri IV in Paris, although the Trotskyist posi- 
tion on the Soviet Union and Stalinism had never seemed very convincing to 
him. When he first heard Castoriadis speak, Lefort was deeply impressed: "His 
analysis overwhelmed me," he said in an interview. "I was convinced by him 
even before he had come to his conclusions. [...l Castoriadis' arguments were in 
my view on a par with the best of Marx, but the Trotskyists called it h e r e ~ y . " ~  
From 1946 onwards Castoriadis and Lefort worked together. As was 
customary in the Trotskyist movement, both had cover names. The first called 
himself Pierre Chaulieu, the second Claude MontaL7 Hence they were at first 
known as the Chaulieu-Montal Tenden~y .~  
The political histories of Castoriadis and Lefort differed rather markedly. 
Castoriadis had been a member of a Communist party and later of a Trotskyist 
organization. In both cases he had only taken up an oppositional view during his 
membership. He was thus used to party discipline - at least for a while. Lefort, 
on the other hand, had no such experience. He had spent fewer years as a 
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member of a party organization and had taken an oppositional view in the 
Trotskyist movement from the beginning. The idea of identifying himself with 
any party was therefore a strange one for him.9 This difference between them 
became more critical in later political debates. 
With hindsight one can see that the first period after the Second World War - 
until 1947 -was of a different order from the time which followed. Before 1947 
political relations were relatively open and flexible; later this was to change for 
a long time. The tension between the two superpowers only increased gradually. 
Stalin had not yet modelled the newly-conquered countries in Eastern Europe 
after the Soviet example and Truman had not yet decided to employ the enor- 
mous economic potential of his country as a weapon against communism. 
In Western Europe the war had brought about a strong shift to the left. The 
Communist parties were more popular than ever. Their percentage of the vote 
often grew to a multiple of what it had been before the war: there was a massive 
increase in membership. After the years of misery in the depression and the war 
the population longed for progress and social reforms. Communists had been 
taken into the government in many countries. At the beginning of 1947 Austria, 
Belgium, France, Italy, Iceland and Finland all had Communist ministers. 
In the course of 1947 this relatively peaceful CO-existence came to an end. 
The relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union had been wors- 
ening for some time. Economic problems came to the fore in Western Europe, 
while at the same time the American economy was in danger of overheating and 
frantically searched for new markets. It was in these circumstances that George 
Marshall, the American Secretary of State, developed the plan to offer Europe a 
substantial program of aid. In this way a number of aims could be achieved at the 
same time: the power of capitalism in Europe would be increased; American 
capital could secure its exports; and the influence of communism could be 
forced back. The Marshal1 Plan marked a turning point which led to a changed 
international constellation. In Western Europe the Communist ministers were 
put out of office. In Eastern Europe a political and economic transformation to 
'people's democracies' was enforced, which meant that these societies increas- 
ingly began to resemble Soviet society. The polarization between the blocks 
started dominating developments: the Cold War had started. 
In France bourgeois circles had happily used the Communists and their 
influence in the large trade union federation CGT immediately after the end of 
the German occupation. By letting them form a government together with the 
Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats in 1945 Charles de Gaulle - who 
had become prime minister for a short while in November - hoped to be able to 
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discipline the workers. The Monnet Plan, which regulated the reconstruction, 
was supported by the Communist PCF. The New York Herald Tribune wrote on 
12 July 1946: "The key for the success of the plan to date, which has been 
considerable, is the enthusiastic co-operation of the French Communist Party. 
The Communists dominate the most important unions in the CGT, the large 
French trade union federation. The Communist leadership has been responsible 
for such surprising steps as the acceptance by the most important French unions 
of a kind of adjusted piece rate system, which rewards individual workers with 
a high output." This policy was also supported by the Social Democrats. The 
policies of the two French workers' parties led to wage decreases in a period of 
inflation and therefore helped to lower living standards. 
The Communists' integration policy could not, however, altogether prevent 
the workers from standing up for their interests. In January 1946 typographers, 
demanding higher wages, went on strike. In July 1946, postmen stopped work. 
And in April 1947 there were strikes at the Renault car works, which had been 
nationalized a couple of years before. It was especially this last strike, in which 
Trotskyists had played a leading role (a "Gaullist-Trotskyist-anarchist chaos," 
according to the secretary of the CGT, Plaisance), that made clear that the 
Communists were starting to lose their grip on developments. On 30April 1947 
Communist leader Maurice Thorez informed the government that the PCF could 
no longer support the price and wage policy of the government. Ramadier, the 
social democrat prime minister, who was under pressure from Washington, used 
the opportunity to throw the Communists out of the government a few days later. 
The PCF and the social-democratic SF10 now increasingly opposed one 
another. The latter, pro-American and a participant in a number of later govern- 
ments, was bitterly opposed by the former. In the period 1947-49 there were 
great strike waves throughout the country, now wholeheartedly supported by the 
PCF and CGT. The Social Democrats, for their part, attempted to undermine the 
workers' resistance. Financially supported by the CIA, they succeeded in split- 
ting the CGT and in setting up a new 'moderate' trade union federation (Force 
Ouvrikre). Although this remained a far smaller organization than the CGT, 
many trade union members became demoralized by the new divisions. Within a 
few years more than half the CGT members had departed, leaving about two 
million halfway through the 1950s. Force Ouvriire started out with a few 
hundred thousand members and never managed greatly to increase this number. 
The Cold War, the economic recovery of the 1950s, and the antagonism 
between the two 'workers' parties' and their trade unions, resulted in a clear drop 
in militancy: the radical zeal disappeared. In 1947 there had been more than 22 
million strike days; by 1952 this had dropped to less than one and a half million. 
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The circumstances for radical socialists were naturally very difficult. Enormous 
political pressure was exerted on all kinds of far left groups (Council 
Communists, Trotskyists, ~ o r d i g i s t s , ' ~  etc.) to join one camp or the other: 
Washington or Moscow. Those who refused such a choice were not given a hear- 
ing and were deemed suspect. The anti-capitalist opposition was completely 
monopolized by the Communists. There was hardly any room for independent 
revolutionaries. 
The isolation had two contradictory consequences. On the one hand the 
lack of successful practical activities led to a greater emphasis on theoretical- 
programmatic questions. Naturally this resulted in differences of opinion and 
quite often ended in large conflicts and even splits. On the other hand the enmity 
of the world 'outside' brought the small left-radical groups together, resulting in 
co-operative ties despite the political differences. There was a kind of 'dialectic' 
of division and reunion. 
The changed situation also led to intense debates within the international 
Trotskyist movement, especially about Eastern Europe. It is unnecessary to 
enter into the niceties of this discussion; it seems sufficient to note that there 
were minorities in a number of countries who refused to regard the Soviet Union 
as a 'transitional society' between capitalism and socialism, as had Trotsky. 
These minorities considered both East and West to have equally reprehensible 
systems of exploitation and repression. In the United States such a view was 
defended by a group known as the Johnson-Forest Tendency. Johnson was the 
pseudonym of the black revolutionary C.L.R. James, Forest the cover identity of 
Rae Spiegel (Raya Dunayevskaya), a former secretary of Trotsky. In Great 
Britain the opposition inside the Trotskyist movement was led by Ygael 
Gluckstein from Palestine, who operated under the name of Tony Cliff. In 
France it was Castoriadis and Lefort in their Chaulieu-Montal Tendency who 
voiced the opposition to the old viewpoints. All these opponents left the interna- 
tional Trotskyist organization, the Fourth International, between 1948 and 195 1 
in order to set up independent groups. They were to maintain regular contacts 
with each other. Castoriadis and Dunayevskaya were still working together in 
the Sixties." 
In August 1946 Castoriadis and Lefort published On the Regime andAgainst the 
Defence of the USSR, in which they criticized the Trotskyist critical-positive 
evaluation of the Soviet Union. They especially opposed the idea that Stalinist 
society -despite the shortcomings also admitted by the Trotskyists (specifically 
the lack of any democracy) - should have to be defended against capitalism. 
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Castoriadis and Lefort proposed that a new elite, a "social layer" of bureaucrats, 
had achieved power in the USSR and that this elite exclusively defended its own 
interests rather than those of the Soviet workers. For this reason the Soviet 
Union was a new kind of society, which strove for expansion just as much as 
Western capitalism.12 
In a later stage Castoriadis and Lefort abandoned the characterization of the 
Soviet Union as a new type of society and described it as 'bureaucratic capital- 
ism.' According to them this was a society based on exploitation, without the 
classic laws of competitive capitalism but with the surplus value formation typi- 
cal of capitalism. 
Numerous articles were written by the opposition to convince their 
Trotskyist party comrades.I3 When this failed and the Chaulieu-Montal 
Tendency seemed doomed to remain a small minority within a movement that 
was itself quite tiny,'"he dissidents decided to break with the Fourth 
International. At the end of 1948 ten or twenty of them left the organization.15 In 
March 1949 the group published the first issue of the magazine Socialisnze o~c 
Barbarie - a well-made periodical of one hundred pages or more. The reasons 
for leaving the Fourth International were once again explained in an open letter 
to the members of the Fourth International who had been left behind. 
Trotskyism was reproached for being a movement without political-theoretical 
power because it was incapable of finding an "independent ideological basis for 
existence." Trotskyism could not truly liberate itself from Stalinism, because it 
continued to define itself as the opposite of Sta:inism.I6 
The central article of the first issue was an extensive text entitled 
"Socialism or Barbarism," which amounted to a statement of the group's posi- 
tion. This text was mostly written by Castoriadis. Just as Marx wanted to give a 
programmatic foundation to the League of Communists with his Manifesto of 
the Communist Party, so Castoriadis attempted to formulate a political founda- 
tion for the new organization with "Socialism or Barbarism." He took the world 
situation, which had changed so thoroughly as a result of the Second World War, 
as his point of departure. Two "superstates" had divided the world between 
them: the United States and the Soviet Union. Both had expansionist tendencies 
and strove to dominate the other. The result of this would inevitably be a third 
world war, which would result in barbarism for international society, unless the 
power elites in East and West were overthrown through a radical-socialist revo- 
lution. Socialism or Barbarism: those were the only remaining roads for human- 
ity. 
What would such a radical-socialist revolution mean? Its point of departure 
would lie in the most fundamental contradiction shared by East and West, 
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bureaucracy and competitive capitalism: the contradiction between managing 
and subordinate labour. While it had seemed in Marx's time that the ending of 
the private ownership of the means of production would be sufficient to remove 
injustice and exploitation from the world, it had now become clear - among 
other things because of the existence of the Soviet Union -that state ownership 
of the means of production did not necessarily lead to socialism or even 
improved circumstances. On the contrary, it might lead to increased exploitation 
and repression. Developments in competitive capitalism had shown that it was 
notjust a question of the ownership of the means of production: to an increasing 
extent entrepreneurial leadership and capital ownership were being separated 
while the importance of the managers versus the owners had increased." 
Everything therefore revolved around the struggle against hierarchy and 
bureaucracy. All power must reside in the rank and file, among the working 
population. 
Right from the start there was a debate on matters of organization in Socialisnze 
ou Barbarie. What exactly was the group's self-definition? Was it to be a collec- 
tion of independently acting militants, with no responsibilities whatsoever, or 
was it necessary to develop a common praxis alongside the journal? If so, should 
such activity assume the role of a vanguard, or not? How was the organization to 
be internally structured? Was democratic centralism finished or not? 
In April 1949 the majority of the group voted for a resolution which was to 
serve as a programmatic basis for future work. In it the Leninist conception of 
arousing political consciousness in the working class from the outside was 
rejected, as was the idea that the group was to be merely "a collection of indi- 
viduals" who would restrict themselves to publishing a "more or less academic 
journal." Yet despite this delineation of aims, the group remained more or less 
'old-fashioned': Socialisme ou Barbarie was to develop into a revolutionary 
party, capable of leading and co-ordinating the independent workers' struggle, 
directed at the conquest of state power.I8 
There was opposition to this resolution, but it was weak. It was only in 
1951-52, after a small group of ex-Bordigists had joined,I9 and the membership 
had shrunk further, that the few opponents decided to voice their own opinion 
more openly.20 Claude Lefort, especially, opposed the attempts to form a 
vanguard party. 
In the preceding years Lefort had gradually developed his doubts about 
thinking in terms of a vanguard, not in Socialisme ou Barbarie, but through arti- 
cles in Les Temps Modernes, the journal founded in 1945 by Jean-Paul Sartre, 
Simone de Beauvoir and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Lefort's friend and philoso- 
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phy tutor, among  other^.^' At the end of 1948 Lefort had published a noteworthy 
essay in that periodical, in which he blamed Trotsky for hesitating too long 
before frontally opposing Stalin's party bureaucracy. He ascribed this to 
Trotsky's glorification of the party as a "godlike factor in historical develop- 
ment." "Trotsky's battle against the bureaucracy," according to Lefort, "had no 
foundation because objectively Trotsky was himself a founder of this bureau- 
cracy." When at last Trotsky did reject the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(in the 1930s) it was too late.22 In another article published in 1949 Lefort paid 
attention to anarchism, which he strongly criticized. "Anarchist consciousness 
is a traumatized consciousness," he argued, "it is a simple refusal of exploitation 
and not its negation, that is to say, the contradiction which leads to a new histor- 
ical expression." At the same time he praised it as a source of inspiration for a 
radical type of Marxism, which opposes state power and exploitat i~n.~'  
Lefort's development caused tensions within Socialisnze ou Barbarie. In 
June 1952 he left the organization along with some supporters, but after a short 
while he ret~rned.~"wo texts were then published in the journal, explaining the 
prevailing differences of opinion within the group. Castoriadis still argued for 
the idea that Socialisnze ou Barbarie ought to be the nucleus of a revolutionary 
vanguard party; Lefort, on the other hand, placed the systematic support for 
workers' control at the centre of his considerations. The essence of Castoriadis' 
reasoning was that the group should contribute to the overthrow and destruction 
of capitalist society and the bourgeois state. For this a political party was needed 
to lead and co-ordinate the workers' resistance. The fundamental contradiction 
between management and subordinate labour, which dominated East and West, 
could not be overcome with one blow: the party had to be a leadership striving 
for its own disbandment. This disbandment could, however, only take place 
after the r e v o l ~ t i o n . ~ ~  Lefort's position was that the essential problem was not 
the organization of the revolution, but workers' power. The power of the work- 
ers would make a revolution possible, but a revolution would not guarantee 
workers' power. The only way in which the proletariat could develop its power 
was through autonomous forms of organization. Everything depended on this, 
and not on the party, which was simply a historically determined expression of 
specific labour experiences and could therefore be superfluous or even undesir- 
able in other circumstances. This is why Socialisnze ou Barbarie should not so 
much concern itself with revolution and the conquest of state power, as with the 
experiences of the working class in the process of organizing itself.26 In a later 
article Lefort further elaborated his position and tried to analyze the 'proletarian 
experience' as the guiding principle of life for the working class.27 With this 
approach Lefort was an important predecessor of the later attempts at analyzing 
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capitalism 'from below' by Raniero Panzieri, Edward Thompson, Erhard Lucas 
and others. 
The heated internal debates in the group were soon followed by discussions 
with outsiders on similar questions. Members of the group were criticized from 
the 'left' because of their position on the vanguard, and from the 'right, because 
they were too hostile towards the Stalinist glorification of the party. It is note- 
worthy - but also understandable, in view of the differences of opinion - that 
almost automatically a division of labour was created between Lefort and 
Castoriadis. The latter took up the defence against party opponents, while the 
former opened the attack on those who favoured a vanguard-party conception. 
In November 1953 Anton Pannekoek, the aging Dutch Council Communist, 
sent a letter to Socialisme ou Barbarie which was also published in the journal.28 
In his letter Pannekoek wrote that he sympathized with the group in many ways, 
but that he also had two fundamental differences of opinion: the evaluation of 
the Russian revolution of 1917, and the question of the vanguard party. Unlike 
Socialisme ou Barbarie he did not regard the October revolution as a proletarian 
revolt, which had later degenerated into a bureaucratic state capitalism. Instead 
he thought that right from the start this had been a bourgeois event, which could 
never have resulted in socialism. As for the vanguard organization, that was 
totally rejected by Pannekoek. He believed that revolutionaries should not build 
up a party but should engage solely in propaganda and theoretical debate. Their 
task was to call for workers' control and not to 'lead' a liberation struggle. 
In his answer Castoriadis concentrated on the question of the vanguard 
organization. His most important proposition was that it was precisely when 
revolutionaries did not build a party, that the way was cleared for a bureaucratic 
dictatorship, as in the Soviet Union. 
Just as the only 'guarantee' against making mistakes consists of thinking for 
oneself, so the only 'guarantee' against bureaucratization is to be found in 
permanent action in the anti-bureaucratic sense, by fighting against the bureau- 
cracy and by showing in practice, that a non-bureaucratic vanguard organiza- 
tion is possible and that it can maintain non-bureaucratic relations with the 
class. For bureaucracy is not born out of incorrect theoretical opinions, but out 
of its own necessities in a certain stage. It is necessary to show precisely 
through acting that the proletariat can do without the b~reaucracy.~' 
A second letter from Pannekoek in which he elucidated certain elements of 
his theory was not published by Socialisme ou B ~ r b a r i e . ~ ~  Pannekoek's central 
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proposition was that a revolutionary party could not save a revolution from 
bureaucratization; on the contrary, it represented "a step in the direction of new 
repre~sion."~' In a later unpublished letter to Castoriadis, Pannekoek added that 
he certainly believed in the existence of vanguards, but that it seems wrong to 
him to capture these vanguards in disciplined organizations: "It is always the 
case," he wrote, "that certain persons come to the fore through their deeds, their 
courage or their clear vision, in speaking or acting quickly; together these 
persons in fact form a vanguard, which we see appearing in every action. In fact 
they become leaders; [...l When they come together in permanent groups or 
parties with fixed programmes these fluent relations become petrified. They 
then regard themselves as unofficial leaders and want to be followed and 
obeyed."32 
Jean-Paul Sartre took up a position totally opposed to that of Pannekoek. He 
turned the Communist Party into a fetish. In his great philosophical work L'gtre 
et le nkant of 1943 he had defended the proposition that those who are repressed 
always need an institution outside and above them in order to resist.33 In the 
1950s Sartre developed this idea to show that the Communist party was vital for 
the struggle against capitalism. In a series of articles in Les Temps Modernes 
Sartre claimed that the working class does not exist as a class as long as it is not 
organized in a vanguard party: " The worker is a sub-human (sous-honzme) if he 
simply accepts being what he is"; he only becomes human when he "becomes 
conscious of his sub-humanity." This consciousness implies resistance and 
organization. However, the proletariat does not by itself come into existence, - 
it is the result of a separate factor, a "third," which brings together isolated indi- 
viduals. This binding factor is the Communist Party. In short: "A worker in 
contemporary France can only express and fulfil himself through acting in the 
class under the leadership of the Communist Party." 
Sartre's reasoning - which is Stalinist not in itself but in its conclusions 
(Merleau-Ponty called it "ultra-bolshevist") -created an absolute contradiction 
between spontaneity and organization. Spontaneity was nothing, was incoher- 
ent, "loneliness." Organization, party-organization, was everything. If the 
workers lost their trust in the Communist Party, then they lost not only their trust 
in the party, but also in politics and in their own class. "The universe" would 
then "be b o ~ r g e o i s . " ~ ~  
Claude Lefort wrote an extensive response to Sartre in Les Temps 
Modernes. He opposed his conclusion as well as his arguments. The party or 
whatever kind of radical organization, was never a 'third,' external factor 
outside the mass of the workers, but always a form of expression of that mass. 
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While Sartre approached the subject 'from above,' Lefort again thought 'from 
below': 
The point is to understand the revolutionary struggle by situating it in the total 
experience of the class. The dynamic of the Russian revolution cannot be seen 
by itself, but must be looked at in connection with a specific proletariat, situ- 
ated in historically determined production conditions and maintaining rela- 
tions with other exploited classes; these circumstances cannot be compared 
with those of any other proletariat in Europe. The organization of Bolshevism, 
its rigorous centralism, should not be seen as a necessary characteristic of the 
labour movement, but a particular solution for the relations between the 
masses and their vanguard. The problem is to know how bolshevist politics 
simultaneously expresses the ripeness and the problems of the Russian prole- 
tariat. Moreover, one tends to ask oneself what the point is of the party in the 
experience of the workers, especially in these times. But that is precisely the 
particular question which certain people want to avoid at any cost. 
Party organization should be a flexible structure, adjusted to the social rela- 
tions in which the struggle takes place. The Communist parties, on the other 
hand, were nothing but elements of the Stalinist bureaucracy in the Soviet 
Union. In this connection Lefort distinguished between two bureaucratic vari- 
ants in the labour movement: the social democratic and the Communist. The 
social democratic bureaucracy identified itself with the interests of the ruling 
bourgeoisie. The Communist party bureaucracy identified itself with the inter- 
ests of the Soviet Union and was therefore ultimately a mortal enemy of the 
native bourgeoisie. The Communist party used the aggressiveness of the work- 
ers to be able to establish a bureaucratic dictatorship based on the East-European 
model and therefore misused the socialist inclination of the class. In that sense 
the Communist party was revolutionary, because it was anti-capitalist, but not 
socialist. The real socialist alternative therefore was to be found outside the 
established 'workers' parties. Since Stalinist parties were also in a certain way 
an expression of workers' experiences, it would be necessary from an anti- 
bureaucratic perspective to discover why the majority of the class follows the 
politics of the Communists and in what ways it nevertheless distinguished itself 
from those politics and the organizations related to it.35 
Whatever the differences of opinion within Socialisme ou Barbarie, the dislike 
of every kind of bureaucracy and undemocratic structures was common to all 
members of the group. When the organization started to grow in the 1 9 5 0 ~ , ~ ~  
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there were more opportunities, not just to think about and write on anti-bureau- 
cracy, but also to act. This was all the more so because gradually social unrest 
increased. In the 1970s Castoriadis described the changes which became visible 
from 1952-53: 
The Korean War was ending, Stalin died, the workers of East Berlin revolted, 
the entire public sector in France went on strike. New life was breathed into the 
group, new people joined, the publications became more regular and their 
contents improved. [...l Furthermore, the group was stimulated by the 
Twentieth Congress of the Russian Communist Party, Poznan and of course the 
Hungarian revolution and the Polish movement. [...l The Algerian war started 
in November 1954. The Mollet government began a gradual mobilization from 
1956 in order to be able to send troops to Algeria. The soldiers called up 
demonstrated and stopped the army trains. The economic chaos increased and 
the movement started stirring. In the autumn of 1957 there was considerable 
unrest in the factories - the situation was unstable and open.37 
It was under these changing circumstances that Socialisme ou Barbarie 
started its work in the factories. Right from the start the organization had 
defended the position that a bureaucratic layer of bosses had developed in the 
trade unions (and especially in the CGT), which had established increasingly 
close ties with the state apparatus. This trade union bureaucracy had become an 
independent factor, which functioned as a sort of link between the state appara- 
tus and the working class, and therefore tried to reconcile both sides with each 
other. On the one hand the bureaucracy partially accepted the demands of the 
workers in order to retain its own mass base, but on the other it also tried to meet 
the demands of the state apparatus in order to remain 'respectable' and to be 
acceptable as a partner in  negotiation^.^^ 
This was not in itself a new analysis; it had long been a part of Trotskyist 
thought. The essential thing was what kind of political conclusions were drawn 
from it. Did revolutionaries have to try to reconquer the trade unions from within 
and to dethrone the bureaucrats; or was it, on the contrary, more desirable to 
work outside the unions and build up new organizations? In practice Socialisme 
ou Barbarie's factory work usually amounted to the latter, but not everybody 
was happy about this. In the period 1954-55 a debate on this topic took place in 
the journal. Daniel Motht defended the position which supported working 
outside the unions. Other participants' in the debate, like the anarchist Fontenis, 
thought that revolutionaries should be active in the trade unions because this 
was the only way for them to make contacts with the workers and win their trust: 
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"Fighting from the outside implies cutting oneself off from one's audience. And 
let us not forget that in certain sectors, where the workers are distributed 
amongst an infinite number of workplaces or small firms, the trade union meet- 
ing is the only way in which the workers can be brought together and to made to 
listen."39 
Socialisnze ou Barbarie's most important factory work took place in the Renault 
factories in Paris-Bilancourt, although actions were also organized in other 
places, including an insurance firm. The driving force at Renault was Daniel 
MothC, a politically experienced worker who had joined the group in 1952. Like 
his fellow group members he had received his inspiration and general ideas 
about what was happening in modern capitalist firms from the American group 
of sympathizers around C.L.R. James and Raya Dunayevskaya. 
Inspired by developments in the United States, the American revolutionar- 
ies assumed that 1914 had been a kind of watershed in the history of capitalist 
management techniques .After that year Frederick Winslow Taylor's "scientific 
management" was applied more and more widely. When the Ford system with 
its conveyor belts was added to this (in the period 1924-28), labour processes 
changed fundamentally. The educational level demanded for workers 
decreased, the pace of work and the sequence of work acts were no longer 
dictated by humans, but by machines. Influenced by the great economic reces- 
sion of 1929 this change was accelerated even more. The mass of workers 
became "hunted, working for starvation wages," dominated by "a staff of 
managers who can only carry out the production through the use of a hired gang 
[...l of gangsters, murderers, foremen."40 The new structure of the labour 
process left its mark on the daily life and the consciousness of the workers, 
according to this same analysis. The point was to study the consequences of 
these changes for the self-organization of the workers. 
As early as 1946 the group around James and Dunayevskaya published a 
pamphlet entitled The American Worker. In this publication Paul Romano ("I 
am a young worker approaching thirty") described his life in and outside the 
factory: the physical exertion demanded by the work, the weekend, family life 
and forms of shopfloor resistance."' This approach, a novel one at the time, with 
a view of modern capitalist reality from the perspective of the daily life of the 
(male) worker, was an attractive one for European radical leftists. The story by 
Paul Romano was serialized in Socialisme ou Barbarie and later in an Italian 
periodical as The Americans were also the first of the radical leftists to set 
up factory work. Worker members of the group founded a paper called 
Correspondence in 1953, meant to be an organ of independent (not controlled 
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by the trade unions) workers' struggles in the factories.43 
All this stimulated Socialisme ou Barbarie into making similar efforts. 
Developments in factories were reported more and more often in the journal, a 
series was published on 'Life in the Factory' and the American example was 
followed by producing a factory paper.44 In April 1954 workers in one of the 
Renault workshops distributed a leaflet on wage levels; this leaflet gained a lot 
of support among other groups of workers in the firm and as a result the first 
issue of Tribune Ouvri2re, a stencilled, independent monthly paper for the 
personnel of the car factory, appeared in May 1954.45 With or without direct 
influence from Socialisnze ou Barbarie similar newspapers came into being 
within a short time outside Paris (Nantes, Bordeaux, Toulouse) and in other 
firms in Paris (BrCguet, Morse, etc.) At the beginning of 1958 they decided to 
work together.46 
The year 1958 marked a break in French post-war history. On 13 May the army 
took power through a coup in the Algerian colony in the hope of being able to 
fight the liberation movement more effectively. In France itself the highest 
circles of the state apparatus were in a state of panic -fearing that they were no 
longer capable of 'controlling' developments in the home country and the 
colonies. For a long time nothing had been heard from General de Gaulle, who 
had been prime minister in ' 45 '46  and had for a number of years (1947-53) 
vainly attempted to control the turn of events with his own party (the 
Rassemblement du Peuple Frangais). Now, on 1 June 1958, he was ordered by 
the National Assembly to reform the state apparatus. He carried out this task 
conscientiously. On 21 December he had himself voted head of state, after 
which he concentrated more and more power in his own hands. In 1962 he 
passed a new law which allowed the president to be chosen by the people and no 
longer by parliament. His regime started to take on 'bonapartist' trappings; it 
increasingly took on the characteristics of a conservative dictatorship. 
Castoriadis regarded this development as the political expression of a deep 
crisis of French capitalism. As early as mid-1958 he published an analysis in 
Socialisme ou Barbarie in which the deep-seated unevenness of post-war 
French development played a central role. He considered the country to be split 
into two contrasting economic sectors: a very modern and dynamic versus an 
obsolete and backward capitalism. He supposed that these two sectors (the 
France "of 1958" and the France "of 1858") could not tolerate one another. "The 
fast development of a large, modern industry cannot, in the course of time, be 
combined with the maintenance of entire economic sectors (agriculture, small- 
scale trade, small-scale industry) in their present anachronistic form and the 
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conservation of the corresponding layers of the population." The continued 
existence of a backward sector, which still carried a lot of political weight, had 
contributed to the blocking of the parliamentary system. It had strengthened the 
process of disintegration of the bourgeois political forces; consecutive govern- 
ments had been made subservient to the special interests of one group or 
another; through this splitting of forces the state apparatus lost its ability to act 
on behalf of the interests of capitalism as a whole. "Parliament and government 
[...l have become almost exclusive instruments of those specific interests." The 
lack of even one specific 'workers party' had strengthened this bourgeois 
impasse. The reformist pressure which could have forced the bourgeoisie to 
discipline itself and consolidate into one conservative political party, was lack- 
ing. Large parts of the state apparatus were therefore obsolete from a modern 
capitalist point of view; the taxation system was mostly indirect, the credit 
system "exceptionally modern under Napoleon 111," etc. Together these factors 
had, according to Castoriadis, resulted in a situation in which French capitalism 
after 1945 had been unable to work out a coherent policy and to put it into prac- 
tice. The objective course of development after 13 May 1958 was therefore the 
restructuring of the bourgeois state and the elimination of the backward 
elements of French society. 
In Castoriadis' eyes, de Gaulle's coup was not a defeat for the French work- 
ing class. The fact that only a small part of that class had taken part in the demon- 
strations called on 28 May 1958 by the CGT and the Communists did not, from 
his point of view, mean that the class was beaten or depoliticized. On the 
contrary, the situation was continually debated in the factories. But the workers 
-partly because they did not yet know what de Gaulle would be able 'to deliver' 
- did not feel like fighting for a return to the situation before 13 May: "The 
workers and more generally the largest part of the wage earners are sick of the 
capitalist republic." The workers therefore awaited further steps by de Gaulle; 
his deeds would determine their reaction. Should the project succeed and result 
in a modernization of capitalist relations in France, then a non-violent democra- 
tization seemed possible. If on the other hand de Gaulle's project were to fail 
partially cr totally, and the situation were to worsen politically and economi- 
cally, then a massive workers' protest seemed quite likely. 
In these circumstances Castoriadis saw a dual task for the revolutionary 
socialists: On the one hand they should help build independent workers' organi- 
zations and papers, similar to those starting to come to the fore at Renault and at 
other firms; at the same time there would have to be a co-ordination of the vari- 
ous resistance committees and a national workers' paper. On the other hand the 
revolutionaries, now spread out all over the country and in numerous groups (the 
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"diffused vanguard), would have to be brought togethzr in one organization - a  
new type of party, based on experiences since 1917: 
The programme of this organization should be socialism, embodied in work- 
ers' power, the total power of the workers' councils which will realize the 
workers' management of the firm and of society. The structure of the organiza- 
tion should be democratic-proletarian, and it should express the domination by 
the grass roots in all aspects of life and organizational activity, and which in 
itself suppresses the distinction between leaders and led. The methods of work 
must agree with the priority of the grass roots and should give all militants the 
possibility of understanding what the organization is doing, and to control it.47 
Castoriadis' opinion about the tasks of French revolutionaries was certainly not 
commonly shared in Socialisme ou Barbarie. 
In September 1958 Socialisme ou Barbarie definitively split. Two Dutch 
Council Communists were present. In their account of the events -published in 
the contemporary paper Spartacus - they assumed that there had been three 
currents within the group: 
a) a group still strongly inspired by Leninism, to which the ex-Bordigist 
VCga belonged; this current was referred to as  the "right wing" by the 
Dutchmen; 
b) the "centre" around Castoriadis; 
c) the "left" around Lefort. 
Using this yardstick, they wrote the following: 
It is not the left wing which completed the break, but the right and centre, 
which deliberately steered for it. So deliberately, that the break came before the 
congress where left, centre and right were to discuss their differences of opin- 
ion. This congress was to take place in Paris on Saturday, 27 and Sunday, 28 
September 1958. It did not take place. At least, it did not take place as planned. 
[...l Two meetings had been organized, on Thursday 18 and 25 September, to 
prepare for the congress. Both right and left had prepared a text which would 
serve as a point of departure for the discussion. Both of these texts [...l natu- 
rally had an entirely different character; one could clearly discern the funda- 
mental differences which had existed between the two currents for a long time: 
but there was nothing which indicated that the existing situation, in which the 
left and right worked in a single group, would shortly come to an end?8 [...The] 
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differences were in no way brought to a head in the bulletin, which had been 
compiled by a member of the left wing. [...l The debate on both texts, which 
started on Thursday, 18 September, consequently had a vehement but at the 
same time friendly character. On Wednesday, 24 September something unex- 
pected happened. The centre published a sequel to its text, which especially 
concerned the position and presentation of the left. The accent of this second 
paper was extremely sharp. The left were accused of propounding their theory 
'while knowing better,' and of 'knowingly misleading the workers.' Its behav- 
iour was even described as 'dishonest,' while the criticism of the right and the 
centre by the left, was turned into a downright caricature. Under these circum- 
stances the preparatory meeting of Thursday, 25 September lost every 
semblance of geniality. The left expected that, at the very least, certain state- 
ments, like those concerning 'deceit' and 'deception' would be dropped imme- 
diately because upholding them would naturally make any discussion impos- 
sible. The most important spokesman of the centre refused. He declared that it 
was not his habit to be swayed by his emotions and that he had calmly consid- 
ered every word and did not wish to take back a single word or sentence. At that 
the comrades of the left stood up and left the room. On Friday, 26 September 
they met separately and took the decision that they would rlot be present at the 
congress, which started on the 27th. Thus came the break-up.49 
The  splitting-up of Socialisme ou Barbarie was  the result of the fact that the 
majority of the group wanted to form a vanguard organization i n  the short term, 
because they judged the conditions to  be favourable (De  Gaulle's coup, their 
own The  minority, which saw nothing in such a project, was a 
nuisance and was therefore 'removed' through a contrived break. 
In the preceding period Lefort's opposition had already intensified. H e  
himself has indicated two reasons for this. On  the one hand there was the close 
co-operation which had grown between Castoriadis and Dunayevskaya in the 
1950s. Lefort largely appreciated Dunayevskaya's opinions o n  the day-to-day 
resistance of industrial workers and her ideas o n  autonomous forms of organi- 
zation. Hcwever, his abhorrence of  her philosophical approach, with which she, 
according to Lefort, wanted to create "in vague Hegelian terms" a synthesis 
between world history and social life, was stronger: "The close relationship 
between Castoriadis and [Raya Dunayevskaya] for  the first t ime made m e  aware 
of the deep conceptual differences which formed the basis of our  political differ- 
e n c e ~ . " ~ '  O n  the other hand Lefort had strengthened his opposition in reaction to 
the current in Socialisme ou Barbarie which was still inspired t o  a large degree 
by the Bolshevists, and to which several newcomers - among them Jean- 
Franqois Lyotard and Pierre-Fran~ois Souyri - belonged, as  well as  VCga.S2 
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The split was merely the sudden end of a process of alienation which had 
been going on for years. After the split Socialisnze ou Barbarie published texts 
by Castoriadis and Lefort outlining their opposing positions. The central propo- 
sition of Castoriadis's article was that any organization could degenerate into a 
bureaucratic monster, but that such degeneration could definitely be prevented 
if a conscious permanent struggle is waged against it. Furthermore, this could 
best be done by structuring the organization on a grass-roots basis. The working 
class badly needed a new type of organization along these lines, in view of exist- 
ing needs for information, discussion, the exchange of experiences and commu- 
nal action.j3 In his article, Lefort recognized the need for organized workers' 
action as well as for co-ordination and the exchange of experiences; but he 
denied that a separate party was necessary for this, as Castoriadis thought. That 
task could be fulfilled by groups of workers and employees in the firms, without 
intervention by a separate vanguard. The revolutionary socialists must, insofar 
as they themselves are wage labourers in a firm, actively participate. And inso- 
far as they, as intellectuals, stood outside the production process, they could give 
theoretical and practical help to the struggle on condition that they subordinated 
themselves to the broad movement.54 
The split-off group around Claude Lefort, which also included Henri 
Simon, a white-collar worker who would play an important role in further devel- 
opments, founded the Informations et Liaisons Ouvritres (ILO). The group 
published a paper under the same title. It changed its name in 1960 to 
Informations et Correspondance Ouvritres (ICO) and existed until 1973.55 ICO 
took the position that trade unions have a system-stabilizing function in capital- 
ism; that is the way they are seen by the bourgeoisie and that is the reason the 
state apparatus absorbs them in numerous consultative organs and commissions. 
The workers understand this; they don't see the unions so much as an organiza- 
tion of their own, but as a service provider, which they can call on. The relation 
between workers and unions is businesslike, a 'realistic' relationship: "The 
unions use the workers as an army with which they can manoeuvre on the polit- 
ical chess board. The workers make the same use of the trade unions." 
Just as on a national scale the trade unions were simply the intermediaries 
between the workers and the capitalists (and not the direct representatives of the 
workers), so the trade union delegates in the firms were simply intermediaries 
between the staff and management. According to ICO this did not, however, 
mean that trade unions were degenerate, as Castoriadis thought they were. On 
the contrary, they formed "very lively and efficient" bureaucratic machines, 
which did have their uses for the workers. Beside the formal and distant trade 
union apparatus there was a second level: that of practical solidarity and group 
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consciousness in different departments and places of work within the firms. The 
communal interest promoted there happened without the trade unions. In those 
places there was still autonomous activity, which should be supported by revo- 
lutionaries - not as representatives of an outside party, but as colleagues.j6 
ICO did not want to play any kind of vanguard role; the only task they set 
themselves was the establishment of contacts between different (groups of) 
workers. ICO's paper was a means of transferring ideas; it was not distributed to 
propagate the ideas of a particular group, but to exchange information and expe- 
riences. ICO hung on for fifteen years. However, it became increasingly clear 
that the group was deceiving itself. For their paper was obviously not just a 
means of transferring ideas. Yvon Bourdet, who was himself an ICO member for 
quite some time, wrote: 
The militants of the 'I.C.O.' group [...l did not succeed in realizing their theory 
or their announced absence of theory; they could not reduce their own role to 
that of neutral information provider, which limited itself to announcing certain 
workers' struggles outside the place where they occurred; they knew very well 
that the stories they were distributing were not just any old stories. Would they 
have printed the story of a freshly converted trade union activist (except to 
mock him)? There can be no doubt that their trade mark censored their poten- 
tial correspondents a priori. 
Despite their intention of maintaining an invisible role, the ICO activists 
could not prevent themselves from operating as the members of a group with 
some very specific ideas.57 The only alternative to this situation would have 
been for the group to ignore its own aims and simply print everything, without 
any limitations. But this would have made nonsense of the group's aim to pro- 
vide a voice for autonomous struggle. After the revolt of May 1968, when the 
membership of ICO grew explosively, this dilemma arose. Part of the new 
membership began to argue for activities which went further than the ICO advo- 
cated and the resulting tensions ultimately led to dissolution of the organization. 
Socialisme ou Barbarie steadily grew from 1958 onwards. Many public meet- 
ings were organized and the influence amongst Parisian students and workers at 
Renault grew. The paper Pouvoir Ouvrier, which functioned as an overall paper 
of the various independent workers' groups, did fairly well. Castoriadis did not, 
however, simply see this fortunate development as 'confirmation' of 'correct 
opinions. His attitude concerning the opinions of the group, such as those which 
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he himself had helped shape, became on the contrary more critical. By the 
middle of the 1950s he had already brought his doubts about certain important 
aspects of Marx's theory to the fore in a series of articles entitled "On the 
Content of Socialism." At an early stage Castoriadis was critical of two particu- 
lar elements of historical materialism: Marx's economic theory and Marx's 
position on technology. The author of Das Kapital had assumed that in capital- 
ism the labour power of the workers was a commodity, just like any other. By 
putting it this way, however, Marx had made a fatal mistake. For labour power 
does not have a fixed use and exchange value which may be objectively deter- 
mined. The capitalist who buys a ton of coal knows how much energy he may 
extract from it assuming a particular state of technology; but if he buys labour 
for a month he can never be certain what the output of that labour power will be. 
For labour power is a huilzan commodity, which can oppose its use. For the same 
reason labour power does not have a fixed - scientifically calculable - price, 
since the height of the wage is not the result of invisible economic laws, but of 
the relationship of forces between capitalists and workers. What Castoriadis 
reproached Marx for was therefore that he had kept the concept of class struggle 
- which was after all essential for him - outside his economic theory, and had 
therefore not been radical enough. If one did include the concept of labour as a 
human commodity in the analysis, then all the other laws which Marx had 
formulated (labour value, increase in the organic composition of capital, tenden- 
tial decrease of the rate of profit) would turn out not to be laws at all, but the 
more or less accidental result of relations of force and conflict situations. For a 
vision of socialism this criticism had far-reaching consequences. If there were 
no economic laws, then one could no longer maintain that capitalism would 
reach its end for economic reasons. The nature of history became unpredictable 
and every historical situation was by definition open.58 
In traditional 'scientific socialism' the technological forces of production 
(machines) were regarded as an independent and neutral factor. The factory, for 
example, was described in Das Kapital as a peak of efficiency and rationality. 
Capitalist technology used in such a factory was simply the technology. The 
problem in a society based on competition and profit lay exclusively in the 
application of technology: in socialism other priorities in production would be 
set and the workers would themselves manage the factories. Castoriadis, on the 
other hand, did not regard technology as neutral; in this field, too, he discerned 
the problem of force relations and struggles. He regarded the continued splitting 
up of particular tasks (conveyor belts and the like) as a method used by manage- 
ment to increase their control over the workers. By exactly proscribing every 
bodily movement in connection with machines their independence could be 
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further affected. Technology was, therefore, first and foremost class-technol- 
ogy. In socialism, a new technology should be developed, which enriches the 
labour process and increases the autonomy of the workers. 
From 1958-59 Castoriadis combined his earlier analysis of the main contra- 
diction in capitalism (the contradiction between management and those actually 
doing the work) with his criticism of Marx's ideas about economy and technol- 
ogy. The new critical theory of society which grew from this assumed that the 
real contradiction of capitalism would no longer be sought in the economic area 
(the Marxist contradiction between the social form of production and private 
ownership of the means of production), but within production itself. In every 
firm and in every office, Castoriadis stated, there was a permanent struggle 
between the managers, who wanted to make everyone work as hard and as well 
as possible, and the blue and white collar workers who were alienated from their 
work. Management faced a very fundamental problem: it was impossible to 
formulate all-encompassing rules and regulations which prescribed all labour 
tasks for all personnel. A minimum space was always needed for improvisation 
and individuality, since there was no such thing as total knowledge of all people 
and all situations. This meant that a certain effort was also always required from 
the workers, an effort which went further than the official requirements. Hence 
the paradoxical fact that the production process stopped short in very short 
order, as soon as everyone did exactly what they're supposed to, according to 
management rules. This was also the explanation for the possibility of 'working- 
to-rule.' While management was forced on the one hand to appeal for the co- 
operation of the staff, it continually tried to limit this room for irregular activity. 
This was the reason for the introduction of 'scientific work organization' and 
similar experiments. But management would, by definition, never succeed in 
entirely reducing humans to robots.59 
With these thoughts Castoriadis made a very real contribution to left-radi- 
cal theorizing. The problem was, however, that Castoriadis positioned his theo- 
ries in an interpretation of post-war capitalism which turned out to be untenable. 
He transformed the proposition that the economic contradiction was not the 
most vital into the proposition that there were no longer any contradictions in 
capitalism at all. And he changed the thesis that the tendential decrease of the 
profit rate was not an economic law into the thesis that capitalism had definitely 
conquered the economic crisis. In this manner Castoriadis, like so many others, 
became the victim of the illusion that the period of rapid growth which had 
started in about 1950 would continue indefinitely. 
In 1959 Castoriadis circulated a text in Socialisme ou Barbarie in which he not 
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only explained that capitalism had economically stabilized itself, but also that 
the living standards of the working class would steadily improve. He added that 
trade unions had become cogs in the system, exchanging wage increases for the 
obedience of the workers; that political life no longer concerned the population 
and had become the concern of specialists; that the workers no longer partici- 
pated in the actions of the workers' parties; that all of society was p r i ~ a t i z e d . ~ ~  
The 'right wing,' as described by the Dutch Council Communists, opposed 
these new propositions. Its members could not understand how Castoriadis 
could still regard himself as a revolutionary, if he saw developments so 
pessimistically. Pierre Souyri, especially, threw himself at a study of the 'clas- 
sics' (Hilferding, Luxemburg, Lenin, Bukharin) to show how capitalism could 
only continue to produce new economic crises. His conclusion was that in capi- 
talist development long periods of economic recession varied with periods in 
which new paths of recovery were explored. The long 'depression' of 1874- 
1896 had resulted in modern colonialism and finance capital; the problem 
period 1930-1950 had resulted in an economy marked by extensive state inter- 
vention, which would itself run into  problem^.^' 
The discussions between Souyri, Lyotard and others on the one hand, and 
Castoriadis on the other. went on for many years. The gap between them became 
unbridgeable and led to the second split of the group in 1963. The 'orthodox' 
side took on the paper Po~ivoir Ouvrier, after consultation. This was not all that 
surprising in view of their continued belief in the importance of workers' strug- 
gle. Castoriadis, on the other hand, kept Sotialisnze ou Barbarie. Pouvour 
Olivrier was to continue pubIishing up to 1969. 
After Castoriadis had broken with the most essential positions of Marxism, he 
concluded in the period 1963-65 that the entire philosophical foundation of 
historical materialism should be rejected. In a series of articles on "Marxism and 
Revolutionary Theory" Castoriadis explained his  consideration^.^^ 
In the first place he rejected the proposition that in human history economic 
development (forces of production and factors of production) is the most impor- 
tant factor, for a particular sector of society can never be more 'important' than 
another: "One cannot say in general that the economy determines ideology, nor 
that ideology determines the economy, nor finally that economy and ideology 
determine each other, for the simple reason that economy and ideology [...l are 
themselves products of a particular stage (and in fact a very recent stage) of 
historical development." A general-genetic perspective was necessary: "In the 
same jungle, separated by a few kilometers, two primitive tribes with the same 
weapons and tools, develop social structures and cultures which differ enor- 
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mously from each other. Was it God who determined that it should be so, was a 
specific tribal 'soul' the cause? No, a study of the total history of both tribes, of 
their mutual relations etc., makes it possible to understand how the different 
developments have taken place." Marx's position on the 'primacy' of the econ- 
omy and the forces of production was an incorrect generalization of one special 
historical case, namely the transition of feudalism to capitalism in Western 
Europe between 1650 and 1850, when an already well-developed bourgeoisie 
pushed aside the absolutist monarchy and the feudal remnants out of economic 
necessity. But this model of historical development was certainly not applicable 
to other places and times. 
In the second place Castoriadis opposed the "objectivist rationalism" of the 
Marxist approach, which assumed that history was dominated by laws. If one 
accepted this thought, then individuals and classes in fact lost all freedom, for all 
of their deeds necessarily followed from the 'laws' of history. In fact history in 
no way developed rationally. It was a complicated combination of rationality 
and irrationality; human acts often led to unintended results which - partially - 
themselves acquired a life of their own. There was an interchange between 
'objective' logic, which ran outside the control of people, and 'subjective' logic, 
which flowed from the choices and deeds of (groups of) people. That was why it 
was nonsense to suggest - as Marxists did - that "the secret" of history has been 
revealed. Such a claim was just as much beside the truth as the claim that "we at 
last possess the secrets of nature," and itself led to misplaced elitist thinking: 
If ultimately there is a true theory of history, if there is rationality at work in 
events, then it is clear that the leadership of development should be entrusted 
to specialists in this theory, to the technicians of this rationality. The absolute 
power of the Party [...l then has a philosophic status. He who strives for a new 
society truly based on workers' control should no longer base himself on 
Marx's historical materialism, but help work on a new theory and politics, 
which realizes that there is no such thing as a total view and leadership of 
history: Whoever wants to be a revolutionary can no longer regard himself as 
a Marxist. 
The left-criticism of Marxism, which Castoriadis developed in 1964-65, had 
important consequences for Socialisme ou Barbarie, because on the inside 
Castoriadis was considered the "brains" of the group. The undermining of the 
trusted political-theoretical foundations resulted in a weakening of mutual ties; 
the lack of a 'programme' or concrete goal began to have a paralysing effect. 
Furthermore, growing doubts had inspired Castoriadis to philosophical, 
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'abstract' thoughts, which were not understood by many group members. The 
periodical had become the most important activity of the group, but was no 
longer the result of a collective effort. "There was no longer a point to maintain- 
ing the magazine and the group under these  circumstance^."^^ In the middle of 
1965 the fortieth and last issue of the periodical appeared. The subscribers and 
readers were, however, only informed of the definitive demise of Socialisr~te oil 
Bar-Darie in June 1967. The 'official' obituary, a leaflet, described the disap- 
pointment which had grown amongst the members of the group about the poor 
results of many years' work. Readers had not co-operated actively with the 
paper but had only consumed it; new members had joined not out of revolution- 
ary conviction but out of social need; the French population in general was 
depoliticized. In this situation there was no longer any room for an organization 
like Socialisnze ou Barbaric. The members would remain active but went their 
own separate ways. If the possibilities for a group or periodical were to improve 
once again, then they would be prepared "to restart our enterprise on a firmer 
foundation and with a different relation towards those who have followed our 
Nothing ever came of it. 
Quite soon after thc founding of Irlforr~zations et Correspondance Ouvrieres, 
Claude Lefort had also parted with this group and left Henri Simon and others 
behind. After this he would never again become active in an organization. In 
order to understand this break in his life, it is important to point at Lefort's 
connection with Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), who had great influence 
on him from the beginning of the 1940s and was also a close friend.65 Merleau- 
Ponty, who is sometimes described as the philosopher of ambiguity and equivo- 
cality, rejected any kind of total thinking. According to him, it would be impos- 
sible ever to know all of reality, if only because we are part of that reality and 
help to influence it. A position 'outside' or 'above' the world did not exist; 
human observation was always only partial and always took place from a partial 
perspective. For this reason we see ourselves in everything that we see and every 
thought about the world is 'ambiguous.' In Merleau-Ponty's eyes Socrates, the 
tireless questioner, was the true philosopher, steeped in the provisional and 
incomplete nature of the 
On the basis of this tradition of doubt and proper modesty in questions 
concerning 'the truth,' Lefort began to realize that his earlier discussions with 
Castoriadis had taken place within the wrong framework. 
Within the limits of a certain logic we were both partially correct and partially 
wrong. He [Castoriadis] was right when he said that self-rule does not entirely 
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exist within the limits of the organs of places of work or industries, but should 
be realized on a scale which encompasses all of society. He was also right in 
saying that those who saw this not only had the right attitude for defending that 
idea, but also to attempt to reach that goal as well as they could; such acting 
further assumes that a course of action is determined, that a vote is taken on 
decisions, discipline, etc. I was right when I said that the relevant thing was not 
the concept of self-rule, the accompanying programme, or an anti-bureaucratic 
speech, but social practice, the real social relations which would be found in 
the Party - which in its turn would, as soon as it had made itself the sole owner 
of that which is revolutionary and universal, would necessarily subordinate the 
struggle of the self-governing organs to its own strategy. I proposed that the 
party had an indestructible urge to consolidate and expand its position and that 
the ruling group within the party had the same indestructible urge to order, 
protect and consolidate its own position, quite apart from the ideas of individ- 
uals. This was the logical framework which had to disappear, the underlying 
assumption which had to be rejected.67 
Both Castoriadis and Lefort had reasoned in their own way as if they stood 
outside the world and could disclose the 'truth.' They merely differed in their 
opinion about the nature of this truth. But would the discussion not take on a 
completely different character if one were to give up the pretence of 'total 
truth'? Could it not be true that precisely this striving for the truth was the ideo- 
logical basis of modern bureaucracy, which attempted to subject everything to 
its 'generally valid' rules? It was in this direction that Lefort began to search. He 
still supported the struggle for self-determination, the building of democratic 
organs at a grass roots level, but he now tended to identify with decentralized 
thinking. He continued to support the struggle against the monopoly of power, 
knowledge and the means of production. But he rejected the idea that this strug- 
gle should be fought according to a general plan (with or without the Party) and 
that 'everything would change' after the revolution. From his own approach 
Castoriadis had reached the same conclusion. He too rejected the 'rationalism' 
which forms the basis of all thinking in terms of the absolute 
May '68 brought Lefort and Castoriadis to the fore. Together with Edgar 
Morin - a radicalized former C o m m ~ n i s t ~ ~  - they wrote May 1968: The 
Breakthrough. It was available in the bookshops as early as June. Of course, 
their ideas still differed. Castoriadis, for example, called for the formation of a 
new organization which could provide continuity and reinforce radical 61an, 
while Lefort was very cautious in this respect. There were, however, also simi- 
larities. The revolt had, after all, shown with dazzling clarity that a revolution- 
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ary spirit could come, just like Socialisnze ou Barbarie had claimed, not just 
from the factories but also from elsewhere. In all those places where there was a 
contradiction between management and executive labour - at the universities 
where authoritarian administrators could decide the future of students -radical 
opposition could grow. Lefort was especially impressed by the students, 
because they did not allow their struggle to be led by predetermined strategies or 
rigid organizations, but acted and spoke here and now. It was precisely this that 
Castoriadis regarded as wrong and one cause of the failure of the revolt. Of 
course he also dismissed the idea of a Leninist master plan, but he nevertheless 
thought that structuring the revolt would have produced more significant 
results.70 
I will not follow the further development of Lefort and Castoriadis here, 
although it should be noted that both developed their critique of the pretensions 
of all theory much further in the 1970s and 1980s. It also is remarkable that one 
of those group members who had opposed the political consequences of this line 
of thinking in the 1950s (i.e. Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard) became a founding father 
of postmodern relativism in the 1970s." Socialisme ou Barbarie's main 
achievement has been its fundamental critique of social hierarchy. On a practi- 
cal level, this critique allowed the group to take workers' everyday experiences 
more seriously than most other political currents did at the time (although this 
"view from below" was male and factory centered). On a theoretical level, 
Socialisme ou Barbarie gradually radicalized its anti-bureaucratic opposition to 
the point where it finally revealed the inner connection between hierarchical 
structures and the category of absolute truth. 
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